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ABSTRACT: The threat to livelihoods posed by the increased mechanization of labour has led to 
the question of whether new technologies will eventually render human beings obsolete. 
However, this immediately raises another more fundamental question: ’what is the function, or 
utility, of human beings in modern society?’ Mainstream economics and the concept of Homo 
economicus tells us that human beings are little more than rationally calculating, profit maximizing 
machines devoted to the accumulation of capital. This paper will argue that the intellectual 
origins of Homo economicus can be traced to the mechanical philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes, 
Locke and Newton, and that these philosophies find their expression in the political economy of 
Adam Smith. It will be shown that the mechanization of labour (along with the subsequent 
obsolescence of human beings) is a central tenet of classic liberalism, the ends of which is the 
unceasing increase of capital through the division of labour. In light of this, Ancient Greek 
conceptions of wealth and economic activity—which prioritize human self-creation and notions 
of the good life—will be considered as alternatives to the norms presented in classic liberalism. 
Ultimately, it is argued that in order to avoid being eclipsed by new technologies we must 
reconsider what it means to be human and in doing so rediscover properly human ends. 
KEYWORDS: Philosophy; Economics; Homo Economicus; Oikonomia; Adam Smith; Hobbes; 
Descartes; Locke; Aristotle; Xenophon; Mechanization; Technology; Philosophy of Technology; 
Political Economy; Early Modern Philosophy; Division of Labour 
 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 268 
PREFACE: ON SYNOPTIC PHILOSOPHY 
Before proceeding I want to acknowledge some difficulties in presenting a synoptic 
philosophical argument. The first of these is the impossibility of an exhaustive appraisal 
of any thinker in their entirety; such is the complexity of another’s thought that there 
will always be omissions made. The second is the challenge of interpreting thinkers 
through the lens of disciplinary boundaries. To their credit, the thinkers discussed and 
criticized in this paper knew no disciplinary boundaries. As such, to approach their work 
through such boundaries would be counterintuitive, if not absurd. The third lies in the 
two distinct modes of doing philosophy. One is the narrow analysis of parts; the second 
is the construction of broad narratives designed at bringing together and making sense 
of otherwise disparate parts. Both modes of philosophy make sacrifices on details, yet 
both are required in the discipline for their respective strengths. With these strengths 
come weaknesses. The danger in synthesizing too much, in providing too synoptic an 
account is the exclusion of particular details. Such an approach cannot do absolute 
justice to an individual thinker, if absolute justice is an exhaustive appraisal of their work. 
On the other hand, a narrow analysis likewise leaves no doubt that it will be excluding 
facts. This is due to the narrowing of scope, the suspension of context and the lack of 
narrative meaning. Discuss any thinker and you are bound to leave out details; ignore 
them altogether and you make it a certainty. From a narrow analysis we sacrifice a whole 
range of related content, implications and, ultimately, the significance of what is being 
discussed; the why in philosophy. Difficult decisions must be made on the range of 
exclusions we are willing to make; whether to exclude details for the sake of narrative 
sense, or narrative sense for the sake of details. Like all papers, this paper makes 
sacrifices. These sacrifices are aimed at generating interesting ideas, problems and 
sometimes solutions. The judgment on whether or not these sacrifices enrich or diminish 
the paper I leave to the reader. 
THE PROBLEM OF HOMO ECONOMICUS 
Homo economicus, or economic man, is a concept that portrays human beings as isolated, 
rational agents who act solely in their own material self-interest.  Equating rationality 
with the intelligent pursuit of private gain,1Homo economicus is ‘dictated and dominated 
by the rationality of industry and utility.’2 The ‘soul’ of this modern economic man is 
                                                          
1 H.E. Daly and J.B Cobb, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the 
Environment, and a Sustainable Future, 2nd edn., Boston, Beacon Press, 1994, p. 5. 
2 H.Y. Jung, ‘Marxism and Deep Ecology in Postmodernity: From Homo Oeconomicus to Homo 
Ecologicus’, Thesis Eleven, vol. 28, 1991, p. 90. 
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extreme self-interest,3 and it is from this self-interest that Homo economicus is inevitably 
drawn into conflict and competition with others. However, Homo economicus is a creature 
that knows ‘neither benevolence or malevolence … only indifference.’4 It has no regard 
for the successes, sufferings or failures of others. For Homo economicus, such concerns only 
enter into considerations in so far as they exist as real or potential market relations.  
Despite never using the term himself, Homo economicus is most directly linked to the 
work of utilitarian J.S. Mill. Mill’s economic man is a deliberately simplified abstraction 
based off reductionist impulses common to early modern science. In this capacity, Homo 
economicus was understood as ‘a hypothetical subject, whose narrow and well-defined 
motives made him a useful abstraction in economic analysis.’5 His rationality was limited 
to self-interest, through an underlying drive for accumulation, along with the pursuit of 
leisure, luxury and procreation.6 Mill’s argument against expanding this range of 
motives was that it would risk greater complexity and indeterminacy, and therefore 
provide less reliable economic modeling.7 In light of this, Persky notes that ‘the message 
to derive from Mill’s homo economicus is not that humans are greedy, not that man is 
rational, but that social science works best when it ruthlessly limits its range.’8 
While there is no argument that Homo economicus is a hypothetical abstraction, the 
very real danger is the extent to which Homo economicus has become a normative script 
for human behavior. The dominance of neoliberal economics has entailed the expansion 
of the economic field into all facets of society.9 Therefore, in neoliberal societies, Homo 
economicus is seen to represent not just the ideal, abstract economic agent, but the ideal 
human being. Daly and Cobb maintain that the abstraction of Homo economicus from ‘real 
flesh and blood human beings’ is the most important assumption basic to contemporary 
economic theory,10 and given the dominance of economics in public discourse, to have 
real-world policies based on this limited account of human nature is nothing short of 
dangerous. While apologists might stress that Homo economicus is just an abstraction 
limited for the purposes of theoretical ‘accuracy’, this should only amplify our concerns 
about what kind of ‘accuracy’ can be gained from such an admittedly shallow 
                                                          
3The Soul of Modern Economic Man, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 2. 
4 Daly and Cobb, p. 86. 
5 J. Persky, ‘Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo Economicus’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 
2, 1995, pp. 222-223. 
6Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p. 224. 
8 Ibid., p. 230. 
9 J. Read, ‘A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity’, Foucault 
Studies, no. 6, 2009, p. 28. 
10 Daly and Cobb, p. 85. 
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appreciation of human nature. Given that ‘the invention of the social sciences … cannot 
be separated historically from the method and metaphysics of early modern science,’11 
and since economics prides itself on being an objective science, it is only appropriate 
that we trace Homo economicus back to its origins in early modern science.  
BACONIAN VISION AND CARTESIAN INDIVIDUALISM 
Modern science can only be understood in reference to Francis Bacon, who 
characterized scientific knowledge as the widest possible accumulation of facts about 
nature.12 For Bacon, ‘Human knowledge and human power meet in one,’13 and it is 
through the steady and gradual accumulation of knowledge that Bacon believed we 
would achieve ‘the true and lawful goal of the sciences,’ which he described as the 
endowment of human life with new discoveries and powers.14 As Horkheimer and 
Adorno note, Bacon’s concern is with the ‘operation’ of knowledge in its effective 
capacity and utility. They argue that the essence of this knowledge is technological, the 
aim of which is the development of an exploitable method of control.15 
Such a method is realized in Descartes who, like Bacon, saw the role of science as 
delivering the control of nature to rational humans. The Cartesian method, outlined in 
his Discourse on Method, consists of four laws. These are:  
I. ‘Never to accept anything as true that I did not know to be evidently 
so.’  
II. ‘To divide each of the difficulties that I was examining into as many 
parts as might be possible and necessary in order best to solve it.’ 
III. ‘To conduct my thoughts in an orderly way, beginning with the simplest 
objects … in order to climb gradually, as by degrees, as far as the 
knowledge of the most complex.’ 
IV. ‘To make such complete enumerations and such general reviews that I 
would be sure to have omitted nothing.’16 
                                                          
11 M.C. Jacob, The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1988, p. 
253. 
12 Ibid., p. 31. 
13 F. Bacon, Novum Organum Scientiarum, trans. J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath., Memphis, Bottom 
of the Hill Publishing, 2012, p. 10. 
14 Ibid., p. 37. 
15 M. Horkheimer, T. Adorno and G.S. Noerr, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans. E. 
Jephcott, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 2. 
16 R. Descartes and F.E. Sutcliffe, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, Discourse on Method and the Meditations, 
London, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 41. 
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Descartes’ method is essentially a doctrine of division that advocates the mathematical 
deconstruction of any problem into its most basic parts. It follows from this that any 
problem can be dismantled and reduced in order to derive objects of knowledge from 
it. When put back together, these pieces of knowledge will lead to a gradual and 
complete understanding, and it is through this method that nature—the biggest problem 
of all—can be understood in its entirety and controlled.17 
Descartes applied this method most famously to his own mind and body. Indivisible 
and absolute, the mind is ‘distinct and superior to matter,’18 maintaining a unity that is 
not found elsewhere in nature. By contrast, the body ‘is always divisible,’19 serving as the 
vehicle that mediates a mind’s rational experience with the external world.20 Descartes 
understands the body as no more than an ‘assemblage of limbs,’21 equating it with a 
‘machine made up of flesh and bones.’22 So automated is this machine that without a 
mind it would still continue to operate in a chain of causation similar to that of cascading 
dominoes. Descartes argues that just as:  
‘a clock, made up of wheels and counterweights, observes all the laws of nature … 
so in the same way if I consider man’s body as being a machine, so built and 
composed of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin, that although it had no 
mind in it, it would still move all the same ways that it does at present, when it does 
not move by the direction of its will, or … with the help of the mind, but only by 
the disposition of its organs.’23 
Descartes notes that such mindless automatons are found in nature, with animals 
sharing all of the mechanical characteristics of human beings, albeit devoid of souls and 
rational minds.24 It is from Descartes that we get the idea that the body is an automated 
machine, a sum of individual parts that the mind possesses. Furthermore, Descartes posits 
the self as the first principle of philosophy and the locus of all knowledge and truth. All 
we can be certain of is that our minds exist. This first person account of knowledge 
represents a radical form of individualism in that it situates the first principles of not only 
philosophy, but of reality, in the self. Descartes’ radical doubt therefore gives way to a 
                                                          
17 Jacob notes that the reward promised those following the Cartesian method was ‘nothing less than mastery 
over nature,’ p. 59. 
18 Descartes and Sutcliffe, p. 19. 
19 Ibid., p. 164. 
20 A. Kirkpatrick, ‘Modernity, Post-Modernity, and Proto-Historicism: Reorienting Humanity Through a 
New Sense of Narrative Emplotment’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 10, 
no. 2, 2014, p. 26. 
21 Descartes and Sutcliffe, p. 105. 
22 Ibid., p. 104. 
23 Ibid., p. 163. 
24 Ibid., p. 65. 
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radical individualism that has inaugurated ‘an intellectual order in the service of self-
interest and human desire.’25 
POWER AND MOTION: HOBBES 
As with Descartes, Hobbes understands life as ‘a motion of Limbs,’26 equating organic 
life with clocks. He argues that: 
‘Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) 
have an artificiall life … For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so 
many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, 
such as was intended by the Artificer?’27 
Influenced by Galileo,28 Hobbes understood the world as consisting of matter in motion. 
Unlike in the Scholastic tradition, whereby heavy bodies are seen to fall downwards ‘out 
of an appetite to rest,’ for Galileo and Hobbes, matter desires motion and will continue 
to move until it comes into conflict with another force which will either cause it to change 
trajectory or stop completely.29 Hobbes applied this logic to the actions of men, which 
he saw as moved by appetites and aversions. Appetite, or desire, is characterized as the 
endeavor towards something, while aversion is the endeavor away from something.30 
For Hobbes, agency comes from the outside. The motion within us, what he would 
call our voluntary motion,31 is motion ‘caused by the action of external objects.’32 Such 
voluntary motion refers to the actions that are caused by the things that we see, hear 
and take in through our senses.33 Our agency is thus dictated by a mechanical response 
to external stimulus. When we sense something through the mechanical apparatus of 
the body, it is deferred to the Cartesian plane of rationality. In making decisions on how 
to act, our mind calculates pros and cons—the costs and the benefits—to arrive at what 
Hobbes defines as the ‘summe totall’ of ‘Addition … and Substraction.’34 For Hobbes, this 
constitutes the very nature of reasoning. However, not all actions in response to a given 
stimulus will be the same. Though reason is ‘a certain and infallible art … no mans 
                                                          
25 Jacob, p. 69. 
26 T. Hobbes and C.B. Macpherson, Leviathan, London, Penguin Books, 1985, p. 81. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 19. 
29 Ibid., p. 88. 
30 Ibid., p. 119. 
31 Ibid., p.  118. 
32 Ibid., p. 121. 
33 Ibid., p. 118. 
34 Ibid., p. 110. 
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Reason, nor the Reason of any … number of men, makes the certaintie [sic].’35 That is, 
reason may be singular and absolute, but the degree to which an individual has access 
to reason will vary depending on the competency of the machine; some machines will 
calculate better than others, or will have more information at their disposal. For 
instance, according to Descartes, those who follow the Cartesian method will have 
greater access to reason and will thus be better equipped to arrive at the ‘right’ decision 
in any given scenario, providing them with the ability to exert greater power over the 
natural world.  
According to Hobbes, it is the pursuit of power that moves men, a conclusion that 
he arrives at through his theorization of the state of nature. In the state of nature, 
Hobbes argues that all men are made equal, and that from this initial equality arises the 
hope of each man to attain his desired ends. If any two men desire the same thing, which 
they both cannot have, then they become enemies and will endeavor to destroy one 
another. Each man thus exists in a state of war of all against all, living in continual fear 
and danger of violent death. In this condition, every man has a natural right to use his 
own power for the preservation of his own life.36 Because of this natural state, Hobbes 
advocates for a central power to ensure peace amongst men,37 with such a central power 
embodied in his all-powerful Leviathan.  
Hobbes arrives at his state of nature in a method that is thoroughly Cartesian. By 
‘stripping away the disguising and obscuring paraphernalia of social life,’ Hobbes desires 
to ‘see man in his natural and essential state.’38 True to form, Hobbes subtracts the 
elements that make up the totality of man’s condition in order to find the denominator 
common to all individuals.39 That common denominator is self-interest and the pursuit 
of power. Telling in Hobbes’ reduction is the conspicuous indivisibility of bourgeois 
values in natural man. While designed as the ‘negation’ of civilized society, his state of 
nature is arrived at by ‘successive degrees of abstraction’ from civilized society.40 On this 
view, such a ‘natural’ man cannot be opposed to ‘civilized’ man, because the ‘natural’ 
man in Hobbes’ state of nature still maintains civilized desires. That is, he desires to not 
only live, but to live well and commodiously.41 Therefore, Hobbes effectively transplants 
civilized man into a hypothetical context, which he calls nature, and in doing so 
                                                          
35 Ibid., p. 111. 
36 Ibid., p. 189. 
37 Ibid., pp. 184-188. 
38 M. Myers, The Soul of Modern Economic Man, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 30. 
39 Ibid., p. 30. 
40 C.B. Macpherson and F. Cunnungham, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Don 
Mills, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 23. 
41 Ibid., p. 24. 
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inadvertently ‘naturalizes’ civilized man. Coinciding with this is a condemnation of the 
state of nature as something to be escaped from. This absurdity, that civilized man could 
somehow be logically prior to society, was not lost on Rousseau, who argued that: 
‘By reasoning on principles he established, Hobbes should have said that the state 
of nature … was consequently the most suitable state for peace and the most 
appropriate for mankind. The reason that he says the complete opposite is because 
he included in savage man’s striving for his preservation the need to satisfy a 
multitude of passions that are the product of society.’42 
Macpherson argues that the state of nature must therefore be understood as ‘the 
hypothetical condition in which men as they now are … would necessarily find 
themselves if there were no common power able to overawe them all.’43 Though this 
state of nature is one based on abstraction rather than historical fact, the legacy of 
Hobbes’ state of nature has cast a long shadow in modern economics, both justifying 
and naturalizing the artificial and ultra-competitive mindset of Homo economicus. More 
immediately, however, it underpins Hobbes’ assumptions about power as the driving 
force of human beings.  
According to Hobbes, humans are characterized by an insatiable desire for power. 
This ‘perpetuall and restlesss desire of Power after power’ is a ‘generall inclination of all 
mankind’ that ceases only in death.44 What Hobbes describes as power is a man’s 
‘present means … [of obtaining] some future apparent good,’45 with such a power either 
being ‘Originall,’ or ‘Instrumentall,’ power.46 Original, or ‘Naturall’, power is that which is 
inherent to the individual, such as strength of body, alacrity of mind, cunningness and 
so forth. Instrumentall powers consist of acquired powers, such as riches, reputation, and 
friends.47 Hobbes considers power to be cumulative, arguing that ‘like the motion of 
heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste,’ it is the nature of 
power to increase itself.48 According to Hobbes the value—or worth—of a man is ‘his 
price; that is to say, so much as he would be given for his use of power.’49 There is an 
equivalence, then, between a man’s price and his power. Power is an end in itself, and 
conspicuous displays of power are virtuous. Dominion and victory over others is 
                                                          
42 J. Rousseau and L. Damrosch, The Essential Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. P. Constantine, London, 
Vintage Books, 2013, p.  38. 
43 Macpherson and Cunningham, pp. 18-19. 
44 Hobbes and Macpherson, p. 161. 
45 Ibid., p. 150. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., p. 151.  
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considered honorable, because it is acquired by and displays power, while to be in 
servitude is dishonorable because it displays a lack of power.50 
From Hobbes we derive not only a mechanical worldview, but also a proto-
utilitarian ethic of cost-benefit analysis. The agency of the Hobbesian machine exists 
outside of itself, residing in the external objects towards which the mechanical vessel is 
drawn. Ultimately, these are either objects of power or the means of achieving greater 
power, and it is through the use of power that one is able to buy, co-opt, and ensnare 
the power of others, thereby fulfilling the natural drive of power to increase itself. 
Hobbes’ model of society thus anticipates a possessive market society51 in which there is 
an ‘equal subordination of every individual to … the competitive market for power.’52 
Hobbes’ Leviathan is therefore not a sovereign power in the mould of a monarch, but a 
sovereign power in the mould of the market, and it is in the marketplace of power 
relations that justice is dispensed and social order maintained.  
ACCUMULATION AND (IN)EQUALITY IN LOCKE 
Hobbes’ model of society is picked up and refined by Locke. Like Hobbes, Locke posits 
his own state of nature as a state of perfect equality.53 This equality gives rise to perfect 
freedom in which individuals are able ‘to dispose of their possessions and persons … 
without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.’54 Following on from 
the Baconian, Cartesian, and Hobbesian approach to nature, Locke argues that the 
earth ‘is given to men for the support and comfort of their being,'55 with ‘the fruits it 
naturally produces … [belonging] to mankind in common.’56 No individual has ‘private 
dominion, exclusive to the rest of mankind,’57 and it is from this common right that men 
are able to appropriate nature through their labour and incorporate it into their own 
private property. However, Locke notes that while ‘God gave the world to men in 
common … it cannot be supposed that he meant it should always remain common and 
uncultivated.’ Rather, Locke maintains that it was given for the use of the ‘industrious 
and rational,’58 arguing that ‘he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 38. 
52 Macpherson and Cunningham,p. 85. 
53 J. Locke, et al., Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2003, p. 101. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., p. 111. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., p. 114. 
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lessen, but increase[s] the common stock of mankind.’59 By taking a portion of land and 
cultivating it, the industrious man is able to improve the land and increase the net 
quantity of goods for all mankind.  
However, what inhibits man’s propensity for unlimited accumulation of private 
property is the perishable nature of goods. Locke’s law of nature, which is reason, is 
based on utility—to take from nature more than one can use is quite literally useless. To 
hoard fruit in a state of nature beyond one’s own needs will eventually lead to its rotting 
and subsequent wastage, with spoilage imposing a temporal limit on accumulation. As 
with perishable goods, one cannot appropriate more land than one can physically 
cultivate, nor land which is geographically distant. Just as with food, land can spoil, 
remain uncultivated, and thus be wasted and unused. This presents a spatial limit to 
appropriation. However, for Locke, there is no moral limit to accumulation. The active 
appropriation of nature is to be encouraged so long as everything maintains its use-value 
and does not perish uselessly at the hands of the appropriator.60 These limits to 
appropriation are purely technical and pragmatic, with Locke arguing that it is only 
through the introduction of money as an imperishable medium that these limits are 
transcended.61 
Locke’s state of nature is thus composed of two stages. The first stage is that state of 
nature that exists prior to the introduction of money. In this stage the exchange of 
accidental surplus goods is encouraged so long as utility is maintained and nothing 
perishes. The introduction of an imperishable medium of exchange, or money, is what 
constitutes the second stage. This arises through what Locke calls the ‘tacit consent’ of 
individuals to attribute value to money,62 giving them ‘the opportunity to continue to 
enlarge’63 their possessions beyond nature’s limits. Since money does not spoil—and 
therefore cannot be wasted—there is no reason why a man should not accumulate 
unlimited amounts of it.64 It is because of money that the industrious and rational man 
can, for instance, enclose vast amounts of land by appropriating the labour power of 
others through wages. Locke’s state of nature, then, is a continuation and extension of 
Hobbes’, with money identified as the means through which unlimited amounts of 
power can be realized and accumulated. The introduction of money indicates a shift in 
the state of nature, whereby from an original doctrine of equality, Locke is able to justify, 
                                                          
59 Ibid., p. 116. 
60 Macpherson and Cunningham, p. 201. 
61 Ibid., p. 104. 
62 Locke, et al., p. 121. 
63 Ibid., p. 120. 
64 Macpherson and Cunningham, p. 104. 
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like Hobbes, a naturalized state of inequality. This inequality is so self-evident, so 
common sense, that to even speak of it would be to risk tautology.  
For Locke, man is an accumulating animal by nature and it is through the 
accumulation of property that we are able to extend the sum of our power. The lines 
between self and property are blurred; one possesses one’s own body in the same sense 
that one possesses property. The self is considered the most private of properties while 
any acquired, conventional property becomes a logical extension of the self. The 
individual’s own body then becomes a tool, a form of human capital, through which the 
rational accumulation of property can be realized. In Hobbesian terminology, the body 
serves as that original power through which instrumental powers are then accumulated. 
This blurring between possessions and persons speaks to what Macpherson calls the 
‘possessive individualism’ present in both Hobbes and Locke. This consists of the notion 
that the individual is ‘essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing 
nothing to society for them.’65 However, the notion of possessing one’s own body can be 
traced back further to Descartes, who effectively treats the body as the property of a 
rational mind.  
Locke’s political theory also corresponds to his natural philosophy, which is situated 
within the corpuscularian tradition. A form of mechanistic atomism, Locke’s 
corpuscularianism holds that: 
I. All bodies are made up of extended solid substance. 
II. All bodies are either individual atoms or aggregates of atoms, with 
aggregates of atoms taking on ‘textures’ that result from the 
arrangement of their component atoms. 
III. All changes to the state of a body are due to a change in texture as the 
result of impact or contact with other bodies; that is, all causation is 
mechanical causation.66 
Deeply intertwined with Locke’s political philosophy is his natural philosophy, 
which understands nature as a collection of atoms mechanically operating in void space. 
The natural capacities and tendencies of atoms are inherent and indivisible; it is only 
through combinations with one another that they receive ‘textures’ and take on extra 
qualities. The same can be said of humans and societies; man is born with innate 
faculties and powers that are indivisible, and it is by combining these faculties with 
nature that men are able to acquire and appropriate greater amounts of power. 
                                                          
65 Macpherson and Cunningham, p. 3. 
66 E. McCann, ‘Locke’s philosophy of body’, in V. Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 56-57. 
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Likewise, society is understood as no more than a collection of atomistic individuals. 
Given that Locke’s natural philosophy describes the world as an aggregate sum of 
indivisible parts, it follows that Locke should also understand human beings and civil 
society as operating according to the same natural laws. If reality is composed of discrete 
and indivisible atoms, distinct from one another and operating in a passive ‘void’ of 
space, it is no surprise that in Locke’s appeals to a state of nature he arrives at a theory 
of possessive individualism.  
THE NEWTONIAN INDIFFERENCE 
Consolidating these philosophies were the theoretical breakthroughs of Newton who 
was also working in the corpuscularian tradition of Locke.67 In explaining the full range 
of natural phenomena using only a few simple laws,68 Newton provided the means 
through which ‘the physical order could be explained and exploited mechanically,’69 
thereby vindicating the mechanical views put forth by Descartes and Hobbes. Newton’s 
laws of motion dictate that: 
I. Every body preserves in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, 
unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon. 
II. The alteration of motion is ever proportional to the motive force impressed; 
and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed. 
III. To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or the mutual 
bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.70 
Newton’s first law indicates that objects are passive, that once they are in motion, 
they will ‘preserve’ their motion until acted upon by some external power. The same is 
to be said of objects that are at rest. Unlike in the Scholastic tradition where bodies 
‘desire rest,’ Newtonian bodies have neither a desire nor disdain for rest. Rather, they 
have ‘an indifference to rest,’ and will remain in that state until ‘disturbed’ by an external 
power.71 This tendency towards indifference is also found in motion, with bodies 
‘disposed to continue in absolute motion … without increasing or diminishing their 
                                                          
67 Ibid., p. 86. 
68 C.J. Berry, ‘Smith and Science,’ ‘Smith and Science’, in K. Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Smith, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 113. 
69 Jacob, p. 85. 
70 I. Newton and S. Hawking, On The Shoulders of Giants: Principia, Philadelphia, Running Press, 2002, pp. 11-
12. 
71 H. Pemberton and I.B. Cohen, A View of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy, New York, Johnson Reprint 
Corporation, 1972, p. 29. 
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velocity.’72 The second law indicates that the alteration of the state of a body, whether 
at rest or in motion, is always proportional to the force applied; that is, the motion of a 
body is constituted by the sum of forces. As Newton notes: ‘double force will generate 
double the motion, triple force triple motion.’73 A body at rest will ‘yield’ to an external 
power and move in the direction of that power.74 For an object to stop, it must be met 
with a force equal to the force that initially moved it. To reverse it completely, it must 
be met with at least double the force. The third law indicates that there is an equilibrium 
of motion in the universe, and that ‘whatever draws or presses another is as much drawn 
or pressed’ by that other;75 for every action there will be an equal reaction.  
On this view, the human machine is matter in motion, operating in void space 
according to Newtonian principles; it is drawn towards external objects by appetites and 
repelled by aversions. Given that humans are understood to be no more than a complex 
assemblage of matter, it is conceivable that the Newtonian ‘indifference’ of matter 
towards rest or motion is an indifference that is imprinted into the psyche of Homo 
economicus. Hobbes’ claim that all matter is in motion, and that humans desire continued 
motion, is not inconsistent with the Newtonian passivity of matter. That the world is in 
motion is an arbitrary fact for both Hobbes and Newton. For Newton—having been set 
up and put in motion by God—our great clockwork universe constitutes an unfolding 
kinetic chain of causation. Were it not set in motion, the collective matter of the universe 
would, by default, desire rest. But because the world has been set in motion, otherwise 
static bodies must be seen as passively waiting for motion. They exist to be acted upon 
by outside forces and will preserve their motion until acted upon by another outside 
force. Since all actions will have equally opposing reactions, and motion will never 
exhaust itself, matter could not desire anything but motion; it could expect nothing but 
motion. So while matter may be ‘indifferent’ to both rest and motion, this is easily 
reconciled with the apparent Hobbesian desire for motion; matter is always acting and 
reacting in a deterministic fashion. Homo economicus, then, is compelled to continually 
bounce around, repelled and attracted by various forces. 
ADAM SMITH AND THE MECHANIZATION OF LABOUR 
These philosophies culminate in the political economy of Adam Smith, whose work 
provides the theoretical foundations for contemporary economics.76 Building most 
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directly on the work of Hobbes and Locke, Smith developed a theory that places self-
interest at the center of social relations.77 For Smith, self-interest is the causal ingredient 
to the improvement of society78 and it is self-interest that drives individuals to provide 
goods for one another. It is not, he says, ‘from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer 
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.’79 
He argues that it is through our tendency ‘to truck, barter, and exchange,’ that we enter 
into social relations80 and that without this disposition, men would be stuck in a ‘rude’ 
state of nature, struggling to secure their own subsistence.81 Such a ‘rude’ state is that 
pre-civilized state otherwise known as the Hobbesian or Lockean state of nature that 
existed prior to the introduction of money. Following Locke, Smith argues that ‘in this 
state of things, the whole procedure of labour belongs to the labourer,’82 but money, the 
‘universal instrument of commerce,’83 is what facilitates the unlimited growth and 
accumulation of property. As with Locke, accumulation is an inherently good thing, 
with accumulation ‘naturally’ leading to improvement.84 
National wealth, for Smith, is derived from the summation of individual labor; if a 
nation is to prosper it must promote the specialization of its work force85 through the 
division of labour. In the division of labour ‘the whole of every man’s attention … [is] 
to be directed towards … one very simple object.’86 Smith notes that in every ‘improved’ 
society, the farmer will be nothing but a farmer, and the manufacturer nothing but a 
manufacturer.87 Smith argues that by ‘reducing every man’s business to some simple 
operation, and … making this operation the sole employment of his life,’88 the division 
of labour will lead to a ‘proportional increase of the productive powers of labour.’89 He 
identifies three benefits that arise from the division of labour. The first of these is an 
increase in ‘dexterity’ of each particular workman, the second is the saving of time, and 
the third is ‘the invention of a great number of machines … to facilitate and abridge 
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labour.’90 The mechanization of labour is thus central to the division of labour, with 
Smith even crediting the invention of industrial machines to the division of labour.91 He 
notes that in the industries where labour has been ‘most subdivided,’ there is a tendency 
for those who undertake simple tasks to invent machines to perform work for them. He 
gives the following example: 
‘a boy was constantly employed to open and shut … the communication between 
the boiler and the cylinder … One of those boys, who loved to play with his 
companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the valve which 
opened this communication to another part of the machine, the valve would open 
and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself with his 
play fellows.’92 
While his language is less explicit than his predecessors, the assumption of man as 
machine is implicit in Smith’s division of labour. The ultimate goal of such division is 
the reduction of man to the simplest mechanical function, followed by the replacement 
of man by machine altogether. Furthermore, in dividing the stock of nations, Smith even 
places individuals within the category of fixed capital, alongside so-called ‘useful 
machines’ that abridge labour.93 The goal of the division of labour, then, is the reduction, 
division and extinction of human labour.  
As with individuals, Smith understands society in terms of a machine composed of 
both fixed and moving parts. One portion is fixed capital, which is the infrastructure of 
a nation that includes useful machines as well the members of the society, the other 
portion is circulating capital ‘which affords a revenue only by circulating or changing 
masters,’94 and it is this circulating capital—in particular money—that Smith argues 
‘furnishes the … wages of labour, and puts industry into motion.’95 
In his attempt to understand society mechanically, Smith must also be understood 
to be working within the mechanistic tradition of Newton.  While not explicit in linking 
his own work to Newton’s, Smith’s early followers had little difficulty declaring him ‘the 
Newton of political economy,’ based on his discovery of the ‘first laws of commerce.’96 
The influence of Newton’s laws is evident in his discussion of the price of commodities, 
which he argues will ‘gravitate’ towards a ‘natural’ price.97 Coinciding with this is his 
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description of circulating capital as the active force that sets the passive machinery of 
fixed capital, including individuals, in motion. From Smith we are provided with an 
account of economics that is akin to Newton’s natural laws of matter, motion and 
gravitation—unsurprising given the unprecedented influence that Newton had on the 
natural sciences and philosophy.  
While the lineage between Smith, Hobbes and Locke is obvious, less clear are the 
continuities between Smith and Descartes. There is, of course, a continuation carried 
through Hobbes’ philosophy of body, but a more direct link lies in Smith’s tendency to 
divide; Smith’s division of labour is the Cartesian method par excellence. Hobbes thus 
serves as the lynchpin between Descartes and Locke. He transforms the Cartesian 
philosophy of body into a political theory that is fertile ground for the development of 
market societies. His brute conclusions, along with their implicit assumptions, are taken 
forward and refined by Locke, a giant of classic liberalism who extends Hobbes’ 
philosophy through his theorization of unlimited accumulation. The laws of motion and 
gravitation provided by Newton consolidate the mechanical worldview and it is on this 
solid bedrock of early modern science that Adam Smith is able to develop his political 
economy as something akin to natural law.   
HOMO ECONOMICUS: AGENT OF CAPITAL 
It is in these philosophies that we get a clear characterization of human beings as 
isolated, self-serving, rationally calculating machines so evidently expressed in the 
modern conception of Homo economicus. However, unlike Homo economicus, the human 
beings described by these early modern philosophers are not abstractions, but real flesh 
and blood machines. It is the instrumental rationality so characteristic of modernity that 
governs Homo economicus.98 Bound up with ideas of utility, objectivity and efficiency is a 
cold, mechanical and rational indifference expressed through the sociopathic drive for 
accumulation. Important here is the word sociopathic, with the concept of Homo 
economicus making some key assumptions about the relationship between individuals and 
society. The model of Homo economicus I have traced here from Descartes to Smith is seen 
to exist outside of, and prior to, society, with society understood as no more than the 
summation of atomic individuals.  
Despite the individualism inherent in these philosophies, it is ultimately a hollow 
individualism. Given that capitalism is ‘a growth-oriented processes … driven by the 
constant need to realize more value,’99 the growth of capital—not the benefit of 
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individuals—needs to be understood as the ends of capitalist societies. Furthermore, 
economics, which presents itself as an objective science, does not exist to merely describe 
capital flows, but to actively serve capital.100 Therefore, the expansion of markets and 
the growth of capital needs to be understood as the normative pursuit of economics, 
while the long-term prospect put forward by the advancement of capitalist societies is 
exactly that: the advancement of capital. While in the short term, the pursuits of Homo 
economicus might be veiled in self-interest, the enduring benefit is the increased quantity 
and mobility of capital. The agency of Homo economicus, then, must be seen to exist outside 
of itself; agency is deferred to that elusive, shape-shifting and ambiguous power distilled 
as ‘capital’, and it is the accumulation and expansion of this medium that the mechanical 
apparatus of Homo economicus works towards realizing. Homo economicus can thus be 
understood as Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man. As Kellner argues, one dimensional man:  
‘does not know its own needs because its needs are not its own—they are 
administered, superimposed and heteronomous; it is not able to resist domination, 
nor to act autonomously … Lacking the power of authentic self-activity, one-
dimensional man submits to increasing domination.’101 
However, this is just one narrative, one account of human nature in regards to economic 
activity. It just so happens that this is the dominant account that has so clearly influenced 
the development of contemporary economics. Addressing this will require wresting back 
agency from the ends of capital and rediscovering properly human ends. Insights to how 
this might be achieved can be gained from Ancient Greek philosophers Aristotle and 
Xenophon.  
OIKONOMIA, CHREMATISTICS AND EUDAIMONIA 
The Ancient Greeks would not consider the political economy described above as 
‘economics,’ but as chrematistics. The goal of chrematistics is unlimited accumulation 
through ‘the manipulation of property and wealth so as to maximize short-term 
monetary exchange value.’102 In contrast to this is Oikonomia, the etymological root for 
the English word economics. This is derived from the Greek word ‘oikos’, meaning 
‘house’, with an oikos encompassing all the people and things that constitute a household 
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or an estate.103Oikonomia is the art of household management, with an ‘oikonomikos’ being 
someone who is skilled at managing a household. For an oikonomikos, whatever benefits 
the household is considered wealth, and what constitutes the wealth in material things 
is in knowing how to make use of them.104 As Xenophon’s Socrates argues, one can 
possess many enemies but it is not a good idea to simply increase the quantity of enemies 
one possesses. That is, he qualifies, unless one knows how to make use of them.105  The 
same is said of money: ‘if one doesn’t know how to make use of it … then money must 
be kept at such a distance that it isn’t even included among one’s assets.’106 Unlike in 
Locke, in both Xenophon and Aristotle there is a moral limit to accumulation, with 
excess considered just as bad, if not worse, than too little.107 Therefore, the wealth of a 
household is understood not in regards to its quantity of ‘possessions’ but in regards to 
its ‘usefulness.’108 
This approach to utility can be understood when situated within Aristotle’s four 
causes. These are: the material cause, the efficient cause, the formal cause, and the final 
cause. The material cause is the physical material from which something is made. For 
example stone would be the material cause in a statue. The efficient cause is that which 
produces change, which would be the actions of the stonemason as ‘the cause of action.’ 
The formal cause is the form aimed at—it is the idea of the statue that enables the 
stonemason to transform the stone into something else. The final cause is the purpose 
of action; why is a statue being constructed? What are the desired ends?109 It is the final 
cause that gives action meaning, and without it we are left merely acting incoherently 
without ends. Central to Aristotle’s idea of household management is a teleological 
concept of well-being that defines the desired ends of the estate. Secondary to this is 
recognition of the means required for attaining those ends.110 So while chrematistics is 
‘part’ of household management, it alone does not constitute true ‘wealth.’111 The true 
wealth of a household lies in achieving well-defined ends. So what are the ends of 
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household management? For both Xenophon and Aristotle, it is the flourishing of the 
polis and the attainment of a good life. 
The concept of the household is thus extended outwards to the polis as a household 
of households. For Aristotle, the state is seen to have a natural priority over households 
and individuals, with society considered ontologically prior to the sum of its parts.112 
Aristotle likens an individual without a polis to ‘an isolated piece in a game of draughts.’113 
Such an individual cannot be made sense of and cannot exist without the contextual 
environment of the board and other pieces. It is through this context that it takes on its 
identity and meaning as a draught piece. Contrary to the liberal tradition, individuals 
and households are not considered to be ‘atomistic entities’ first that ‘incidentally’ 
engage in social relations later. Rather, households and individuals are only able to exist 
because of their social, cultural and political contexts.114 The polis, then, is the locus, origin 
and ends of all human activity and it is only through the flourishing of the polis that 
individuals are able to secure a good life.115 However, such a ‘good’ life is not to be 
confused with Hobbes’ conception of commodious living; rather, it is a life defined by 
purpose, meaning, self-discipline and virtue.   
Aristotle maintains that the universally sought end of all men is eudaimonia, or 
happiness.116 This consists of ‘a well-ordered state of affairs’ attained by ‘rational 
activity.’117 According to this principle, individuals are considered ‘happy’ when they 
‘rationally harmonize their outer and inner world so as to live self-sufficiently.’118 This 
desire for order must not be confused with the desire to control or dominate one’s 
surroundings, but rather to augment and harmonize with one’s surroundings. Unlike the 
passive, reactionary rationality of homo economicus there is an active component to 
achieving eudaimonia that requires conceiving a purposeful activity in life. Such an act 
relies on final causes, that is, a question of why; for what end, for what good? Thus the 
Ancient Greek oikonomikos is governed by a completely different kind of rationality to its 
modern counterpart. It is an active rationality focused on human ends and the quality 
of life lived. According to Aristotle, such a quality is determined by activities,119 and it is 
through our intentional activity that we are individuated and formed as subjects within 
the polis. As Aristotle notes: 
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‘we exist through activity … and the maker of the work exists … through his 
activity. Therefore the maker loves his work because he loves existence … for the 
work reveals in actuality what [is] only potentiality.’120 
There is a dialectical relationship between the worker and his product, whereby the 
worker forms his product, and his product, in turn, forms him. As an elaboration of the 
self and society, economic behaviour is formative; we are formed by the kind of work 
that we do and the way that we do it.121 Economic activity thus ‘produces people as well 
as material products.’122 Accordingly, a good craftsman will work ‘with the mean in 
view.’123 That is, he will seek to perform his function ‘well and rightly,’ in accordance 
with a ‘rational principle.’124 This rational principle, virtue, is defined as ‘the rational 
pursuit of a mean between harmful extremes.’125 
Unlike in Smith, where the farmer is only the farmer, in Xenophon, the farmer is a 
multi-dimensional figure. The farmer is not just a farmer, not just a manager of an estate, 
but a citizen and a soldier. It is through his work that he takes on the attributes and 
abilities that are required to lead a full civic life. Agriculture is the means through which 
the oikonomikos not only increases his estate, but also trains his body ‘to do everything 
that a free man ought to be able to do.’126 Xenophon holds agriculture in the highest 
esteem because it trains people in co-operation,127 physically exercises them, and 
develops in them the principles of self-management and self-discipline that are required 
to participate in democratic life.128 In doing so, agriculture is seen to cultivate more than 
just crops. It creates ‘ideal citizens, who are extremely loyal towards the community.’129 
Contrary to this is a resistance in both Xenophon and Aristotle to work that is considered 
de-formative. This is found in their disdain towards the mechanical arts, which 
Xenophon argues ‘ruins’ bodies and ‘diseases’ souls.130 Such mechanical arts are 
understood as the manual crafts in which individuals ‘are forced to be sedentary and 
spend their time out of the sunlight.’131 This work is considered unsociable and de-
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formative because it gives people ‘no time to bother with their friends or country,’132 
thereby rendering individuals ‘unsuitable for political life.’133 As Wilson and Dixon note, 
the ultimate responsibility of the oikonomikos is ‘to take his place as Aristotle’s political 
animal,’134 and this relies on a holistic approach to work that imbues members of the polis 
with the capacity to participate fully in social and democratic life. In this regard, 
Athenian life needs to be understood as a life lived aesthetically.135 That is to say, it is a life 
full of meaning whereby the oikonomikos ‘sees himself as engendered by and … partaking 
… [in] a larger form of life.’136 
The good life is not measured by the quantity of material goods one can produce, 
but by the quality of a life lived fully and aesthetically. Living ‘well’ is not equated with 
hedonistic pleasure, decadence, or a life of leisure, but is achieved through self-discipline, 
self-management, and, ultimately, self-creation. Such an aesthetic approach to work is 
clearly lacking in Smith, whose ideal conception of work is not in its meaningful and 
transformative qualities, but in its sheer volume of output. The division of labour is thus 
contrary to the purposes of work as an act of self-creation. If work is formative of the 
individual, and work itself is fragmented, then the individual labourer is also fragmented. 
If we are not undertaking work in its fullest, most holistic sense—if we are dividing it 
into extremes, into simple and quite literally de-meaning parts—then we are not, 
according to Aristotle, being fully formed as individuals. 
This chrematistic tendency towards de-formation was not lost on Marx, whose 
works provide a humanistic antidote to the political economy of Adam Smith. This is 
particularly evident in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, where he provides 
what can be read as a doctrine of neo-oikonomia. In the manuscripts, Marx eschews the 
Hobbesian and Lockean state of nature that Smith’s political economy takes for 
granted,137 while recognizing the vital role that work plays in the self-formation of 
individuals.  
For Marx, the problem with the mechanization of labour is not only that it physically 
replaces the worker, but that it also implies a prior reduction of the worker to the status 
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of machine.138 Importantly, this reduction of worker to machine must precede and facilitate 
their absolute replacement. It thus requires a movement in which the worker is twice 
removed—alienated—from their work; first—and most devastatingly—this entails 
the social and emotional detachment from one’s work, and it is this alienation that then 
enables the actual, physical removal of the worker from the process altogether. As Marx 
argues, this alienation of labour begins with the externalization of labour, whereby the 
worker ‘does not affirm himself but denies himself … does not develop freely his physical 
and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind.’139 This echoes Xenophon’s 
mistrust of the mechanical and manual crafts, which are said to ‘ruin’ bodies and 
‘disease’ souls. Though Xenophon was not writing in the age of industrialization as 
Marx was, what this shared suspicion of ‘mechanical’ labour indicates is a deeper, more 
fundamental sense of alienation that underlies the mechanization of labour in its more 
literal sense. The mechanization of labour cannot simply be regarded as the inevitable 
outcome of technological advancement; it occurred prior to the invention of pistons, 
steam engines and algorithms capable of replicating ‘human’ movements. Rather, it 
speaks to a more fundamental way of thinking, being-in and doing the world. The point 
to be made is that these movements are no longer ‘human’, since they are not whole 
movements that are undertaken to achieve the properly human ends of self-creation.140 
What this reflects is a shared concern about the reduction of wholes to parts, along with 
the atomization of the self that occurs when we undertake work that is no longer 
meaningful or self-creative. Meaningless work is therefore identified by the pursuit of 
exchange values as ends in themselves, and from this we can see that the implicit 
oikonomia of Marx’s earlier, humanistic thought carries through to his ‘post-humanistic’ 
works. For instance, the very foundations of Capital are indebted to Aristotle, whose 
concepts of use and exchange value are adopted by Marx in the opening pages. For 
Marx, as with Aristotle, it is use-value that ‘constitute[s] the substance of all wealth.’141 
From this, Marx offers descriptions of the two basic forms of exchange circuit, in which 
he essentially identifies the difference between oikonomia and chrematistics: 
‘The circuit C—M—C starts with one commodity, and finishes with another, 
which falls out of circulation and into consumption … use-value, is its end and aim 
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… M—C—M, on the contrary, commences with money and ends in money, its 
leading motive, and the goal that attracts it, is therefore mere exchange value.’142 
Given that, for Marx, use-value tends to constitute all that is wealth, wealth can be 
said to consist of the harmonization and maximization of use-value. This is in 
accordance with Aristotle, Xenophon and the concept of oikonomia, where use-value is 
that which contributes to a household’s wealth.143 Conversely, the over-abundance of 
goods and exchange values lead to the cluttering, disorganization and decay of the 
household.144 Unsurprisingly, the socialism that we derive from Marx finds a precedent 
in Aristotle, whereby the household, or polis, is seen to exist prior to its parts and to have 
ends beyond these parts.145 That is, there are ends for society that go beyond the 
accumulation of exchange-values, with these ends characterized instead by the 
maximization of use-value vis a vis the flourishing of society through the pursuit of 
purposeful activity. 
Therefore, a distinction needs to be drawn between market economies and market 
societies. In market societies, the whole ends of society are geared towards chrematistics; 
as Treanor notes, in neoliberal societies humans exist for the market and not the other 
way around.146 A market economy, on the other hand, is understood to be subordinate 
to society. In this case, the market exists to serve society through the efficient distribution 
of goods, but only to the extent that this does not come into conflict with societal ends. 
This is true oikonomia. The ends, then, of economics should be ensuring the overall good 
of the polis, which provides the conditions for citizens to maximize their creative 
potential through the pursuit of meaningful activities. Accordingly, the ‘wealth of 
nations’ is not the aggregate sum of property achieved through the division of labour, 
but the cultivation of citizens who are fully formed and involved in civic life, who are 
able to define themselves and their environment through purposeful activity. When 
labor is divided in the extreme, when human activity is atomized, reduced, and 
ultimately outsourced to machines, such a flourishing of human society cannot be 
achieved. 
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CONCLUSION: MECHANISATION OF LABOUR 
We may say, then, that technologies aimed at replacing human labour are purposeless, 
since they subvert the aspect of work that is formative of the individual. In outsourcing 
human activity to technologies, we also outsource an important aspect of self-creation. 
Though the mechanization of labour, which begins with the division of labour, may 
fulfill a crude quantity of need, it strips us of the qualitative need of self-creation. Some may 
argue enthusiastically that the mechanization of physical labour will facilitate the dawn 
of an epoch of leisurely contemplation. However, along with the division of physical 
labour, Smith also advocates the division of intellectual labour. He notes that: 
‘Like every other employment … [philosophy] is subdivided into a great number 
of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class 
of philosophers … this subdivision of employment in philosophy … improves 
dexterity, and saves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar 
branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is 
considerably increased by it.’147 
It is clear that such an approach to knowledge has no place for true wisdom. 
Fittingly, in Smith we get a return to Bacon. We can only assume that this division of 
intellectual labour, along with a reduction of what constitutes ‘knowledge’, must provide 
a great deal of excitement for those who would like to see human activity outsourced to 
machines altogether. A world in which algorithmic chains of knowledge, embedded in 
code, can be compiled, sifted and refined autonomously without erroneous human 
intervention. But to what ends? What is the point? If the ends of capitalist society is the 
advancement and increase of capital, and homo economicus is just a crude information-
processing machine geared towards this outcome, then human beings must be 
considered indifferent and secondary to the process of accumulation; as the means and 
not the ends. On this thinking, it is conceivable that all human activity will eventually 
be outsourced to new technologies that are capable of achieving the ends of capital more 
efficiently.  
The question of whether technology will render humans obsolete comes down to 
the degree to which we accept human beings as machines already. If we accept humans 
as machines, then work has already been mechanized en masse since the time of Adam 
Smith at least. In this case, the outsourcing to more advanced technologies should 
neither be a surprise to us, nor a concern. If, however, we accept that human beings are 
something more than machines, that we do have ends in life beyond realizing the 
accumulation of exchange values, then we ought to be gravely concerned. We ought to 
                                                          
147 Smith and Spencer, p. 15. 
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be concerned not about what has happened to human labour, but of what has happened 
to meaningful work. Are humans obsolete? Only if we stop acting out, in the fullest sense 
possible, what it means to be human. 
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